Organisational principles of the BC and interfaces with competitive entities

Since the First Iteration was put forward as an immediate response to the conjectured chaos resulting from a hard Brexit, the conceptual principles of the BC have become crystallised into a clear and coherent idea that is available for analysis, even inherently as a mathematical model.

The imperfections of the UK regime are documented in the tirade that follows, followed by discussion in the accommodation, that the realisation of what the BC might wish to attain is a maximal one, and is likely to be reduced under negotiation between the UK and the BC.

Before we begin properly, we need to mention that the BC is a cooperative entity, and the UK is a competitive one. A new analysis indicates that we must deal conceptually with the boundary between cooperative and competitive game entities. This is a general problem. We do not know whether our solution is the only one, but it appears it is sufficient.

The BC is not a control structure. It is an ethical system for the provision of need.

It is not a legal entity and has no means of enforcing rules. It allows non-compliance. It has plans which participants can develop so that they can work together. Its structure is that of a cooperative game.

We say communication is a two way interaction, based on interchange of information, control or deference. Transmission is a one way interaction. This may be instructional information. We prefer to allocate generic information on which planning can take place as communication rather than transmission. It may also or otherwise be a directive retaining control of the sender, or an instruction to transfer control. This transfer control structure is discussed in the section on dickbits, or money. It is not usual to consider transmission as a transfer of deference. We adopt the protocol, perhaps if a mathematical formulation can be developed, a sign convention, that deference transfer is described as it is next. Alternatively reception is a one way interaction which it is most general to assume does not occupy the same channel as transmission. We are perhaps aware of this as a feature in the control-response mechanisms in humans. We adopt the protocol that reception is an instruction for execution by the receiver from the sender. Alternatively it may be deference transfer from the sender to the receiver. As for dickbits, there is a needbit circulation in the general case.

There will exist outside the BC a number of entities based on cooperative games. For another entity and the BC there will be a boundary interface between the two entities. The interior of the boundary structure will have a cooperative structure and the exterior will have a competitive structure.

We desire that the BC will have a boundary interface planning structure under its control. Our solution is to have at least three channels, a communication channel which is cooperative, a transmission channel which is directive, attached to an ethically defined competitive game and a reception channel which is deferential, attached to an ethically defined competitive game. This may seem to make sense, but the ideas are so new to us that we may well not know what we are talking about.

We note a further feature which is quite natural but which we distinctly feel there is no proper model at the moment. It should be an intense area for research. The situation for one boundary appears quite simple, but is not a correct evaluation of all circumstances that will occur. We

must deal with the situation where there are many political entities. This needs a generalisation of the idea of a boundary. We have remarked in another context that this is related to an idea of 'packing' of these entities. Whilst the idea of packing is present in communication theory, and its theory seems to correspond to the ideas presented here, we are unaware of this theory being used in such a general context, and we might have thought that packing theory, being primitive in the sense we wish to use it, would be deemed inappropriate for its consideration here.

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A further idea of which I was aware, but I think belongs not to the second iteration but the third, is that the description we have given is incomplete. It excludes negative sum games. It has occurred to us more lately that a model incorporating negative sum games may have a rich structure. It is a conjecture that all aspects of negative sum games are related, it would be better to say antirelated, to those in cooperative positive sum games. It may well be the case, which is conjectured and highly probable, that such an ensemble of games can be used to describe politics, so that actors in this political game can be identified in local and world politics, and even, if sufficient resources were thrown at such a system, it might even be an extraordinary mechanism for prediction.

Just as competitive games have control quantums called controlbits, and cooperative games have provision quantums called needbits, so negative sum games have currency quantums called deathbits. A question is, since controlbits are individually owned by personal control, and needbits are allocated from the global pool to individuals by ethical plans, what is the ownership structure of deathbits? Since individuals have both existence and nonexistence, this might be allocated from the global pool to individuals with unethical plans. For instance, individuals with unethical plans might be the Rothschilds. We think it unlikely the Rothschilds own the global pool. It is interesting that the Rothschilds have power. This can be measured as an extension of the following example. The Windows 10 operating structure was dreadful. A scan of Windows 10 on the internet showed no valid result. Microsoft own the information system, and therefore are at liberty to present to you no correct information about their products if they wish. This is an indication of immense power. It even extends to Google. The Rothschilds are similar. They are immensely powerful and there is no relevant information about them. Like Microsoft, they own the information system itself.

Since the above paragraph was written an account of our general position has been begun in *Multigames and hyperevolution: societies in interaction*. The first chapter itemises important insights in our study of positive, zero and negative sum games. This study has already revealed, and this can be expressed mathematically we believe although we have not done so, that an important feature of our initial strategy was entirely wrong, and would lead directly to disaster. We are therefore in the situation of having to revise our document to the third, and this requires a conceptual and vital modification.

Initially we had thought, that because the capitalist system was corrupt, it was to be entirely replaced by a cooperative structure. A theoretical analysis of games which involve cooperative games, competitive games and games with murder together indicate that this will inevitably lead to the murder of the ethical game and eventually the murder everything in the game. The game will stop without any players, and there will be nothing left. This does not seem desirable from the point of view of the ethical game, whose objectives are lost. The solution, and I think

it is the optimal one, is to maintain the competitive game. This is a control structure. The competitive game is at a boundary between the ethical game and the murder game. If this boundary is removed, the murder game will murder the ethical game, and then having nothing else to do, murder itself. To avoid this the ethical game must heighten the Kampf height, which is a measure of height of the wall separating the ethical and murder games. This boundary has an interior and an exterior. If the ethical game is in the interior, it must ethically enhance, or strengthen, the Kampf height so that penetration of the boundary is inhibited by the negative sum game. This means the ethicality of the capitalist competitive game is strengthened. Simultaneously the murder game will try to reduce the Kampf height. It can penetrate the boundary and murder its ethical interior. Cooperative games do not have control structures. We know they have need allocation strategies which are quite independent theoretically of the control structures. The analysis seems to say that the ethical game must accept the capitalist system and expend considerable effort in extending its ethicality. This means the Kampf height is raised, the murder game cannot penetrate, and then has no option other than to murder itself. This does not mean at all the ethical game abandons its ethics. In fact, it extends it. It acknowledges that it has no control structures, only knowledge accumulation and ethicality structures which allocate need. Thus it should have no fear of control structures which are ethical. Provided it supplies sufficient effort to heighten the Kampf wall, it is secure in its interior and the murder game self-annihilates. An additional feature here is that the ethical system uses reason, but the murder game uses its opposite unreason in its operation. It thus seems that the murder game might have difficulty in obtaining knowledge of its external surroundings. This discussion might lead to interesting new analysis.

It might be clear that our original idea was that capitalism was corrupt and must be removed. It seems we have now reverted to a more traditional strategy. This is not bad if it is based on clear principles which enhance the ethicality both of cooperative interior and the competitive control structure boundary. This means the second iteration, whilst important, must also undergo substantial revision. We continue with the original text.

I remember reading at I think the age of 14 Azimov's Foundation SF trilogy. In this there is a predictive system of future history in the galaxy called psychohistory. I think Azimov was intent on a skit on predictive Marxism, and the unexpected appearance against prediction of the Mule, which represents Stalin. It is interesting that the centre for research in psychohistory is the planet Trantor, which represents probably London in the British Empire. The quest, if I remember of the centre of research into psychohistory by its founder, is to find somewhere at the other end of the galaxy, where similar research is done and they can link up. This turns, in a twist of the plot, to be Trantor itself.

I think an objective of any psychohistory, or any other potential system of prediction of this kind, is to situate it well away from a culture of a competitive economy and a culturally embedded acceptance of a system of control. Such is the UK regime, or any part of it later occupied by the BC. It would be further necessary to distance it from Stalinist systems of control, and also systems prone to corruption of any kind, which are heavily amenable to manipulative overriding control. Its results and its methodology I think should be openly published, and like the Arpnet distributed security system which developed into the internet, the research should be distributed across a network, of which the current network, monopolised by Google is a danger, so that I think a dual backup should be used, which introduces more

resilience. So probably, and I hope such a distributed system would be an ethical information provider, which itself needs considerable planning, it would not be Trantor at all.