Welcome from Jim Adams on

Neurophysiology and Cognition

    This is a joke-free zone.
    Please take your clothes off before entering.

    Quantum chemistry

    Quantum thermodynamics

    So far as we are aware the first accounts of quantum thermodynamics were developed by Yoichiro Nambu in Japan after the Second World War. As described by Nambu
    himself, the conditions in Japan at that time led to widespead hunger, including in the theoretical physics community of which he was a part. The reason for the development
    of this idea is that the aggregate basis of the distribution of states in an object is fundamentally described as a quantum system. Its appearance at the classical level of classical
    thermodynamics is a partial consequence of this more basic structure. Classical thermodynamics then appears not as an absolute system described by axioms, but as an inexact
    consequence of quantum thermodynamics whose realisation at the classical level only occurs exactly under certain conditions. Of course, the properties of superconduductivity
    were in a certain sense well known at that time, and were extensively the object of research in Japan.

    Atomic structure and the periodic table

    Molecular bonding

    Emergent global structures from local ones

    Emergent structures, particularly with regard to quantum structures, have been descibed in a book by Stephen Adler. Although its precise formulation is not the one we adopt
    here, this is certainly an important idea worthy of study, and we must give due acknowledgement.

    Neurophysiology

    Representation and meaning

    Molecular biology

    Brain structures by function

    Interconnections

    The global structure

    Consciousness

    Conceptology

    It is interesting to trace the developments of Bartosz Milewski's thinking from its beginnings to its later discussions of category theory on his website. Conceptology
    appears there, of course not as his own idea, as related to categorical ideas. The reader who is acquainted with my own thinking will realise that I have some fundamental
    objections to it at the philosophical level. We will take our discussion in what follows not in terms of category theory, but in terms of superstructure theory, which is its
    nonassociative extension. Category theory in some formulations is inadequate as a description of systems based on exponentiation, which is nonassociative. In the suoperator
    approach, which provides a model for superstructures going beyond iterative operations of exponentiation, the left nested and right nested suvariety forms, themselves
    suoperator generalisations of multipolynomial equations, or varieties, have superstructure representation in terms of arrows, a categorical concept. The left nested and right
    nested representations above multiplication differ, but are precisely related. Indeed the transformations between left nested representations and right nested representations
    are themselves described by arrows. If we allow the superstucture idea to extend to multiobjects and multitransormations, then the overarching theory we are dealing with is
    the theory of xiqus. At this level, these ideas, at least in their representational form, are what mathematics is about. We have replaced the study of algebraic structures described
    superstructurally by arrows by a xiqu mathematics described by diagrams. This is a new stage in the development of mathematics. It is the contention of Milewski that the
    description of physical processes, at least in the description of methodologies to describe computer systems with abilities in conceptual processing as well as those currently
    available with powers of symbolic processing, which he would describe using category theory and we would prefer to extend using superstructure theory, are a precise
    encapsultion of everything that is needed to describe consciousness. We disagee. Although mathematically we can use arrows describing transformtions in terms of comparing
    categorical descriptions, and decide whether these systems are equivalent, although the categorical nomenclature is different, we contend that consciousness has a physical
    basis. Thus two structures with different physical implementations which Milewski describes as equivalent will give rise to different types of consciousness in these two
    systems, and this is significant. We say this is what consciousness is about. It is about experience and not representations.

    The next idea does not tell us what consciousness is. It does say the current ideas might have a location problem

    It might seem that an investigation of the idea of implementing a system which knows what it is doing is an important one. Intuitively, a system which knew what it is doing
    could be extended to a larger system which knows what it is doing. In a system locally defined and implemented which has no such principle, in order to introduce it at the larger
    stage we have to understand how a large system which understands itself can be constructed from smaller systems which do not. It would seem, admittedly without sufficient
    analysis, that the investigation of this principle and idea might give fruit to systems with consciousness that cannot as yet be implemented in systems which we have available.

    Confronted with no knowledge of anyone who has a coherent and identifiable insight as to what consciousness is, we are forced to the very good principle of resorting to our
    own devices. So I look around the room. I ask my inner being, what is consciousness? I obtain an answer which seems to me to make sense. Clearly many of my ideas are
    deluded and need severe examination. But at least it is an idea we can work with. Has anyone got anything else? I know someone who informs me the human visual system
    is well understood. Certainly, vision provides a substantial basis to what we understand as consciousness, although it is not everything. I have another idea resulting from my
    mathematical researches. Undoubtedly it can be improved, but maybe, conceptually, it has something we can work with. What is consciousness?

    Consciousness is a boundary.

    What on Earth do we mean by that? There are many aspects of this. Historically, in the study of social systems, we reject, as could be expected from my radical rejection of a
    whole phalanx of academic ideas as incorrect, as stultifying tripe with a high incomprehensiblity quotient, all previous conceptual classifications in sociology as worthless.
    However Marx is an excellent provocateur who must be retained, not only because he had a certain partially correct theory with him which needed substantial improvement and
    correction, but mainly because he knew precisely what was going on, and was indominatable in proclaiming it. Other sociology, Adorno crap, Marcusian tripe, and Habermas's
    accommodation with fascism (which he claims to have a separation from capitalism, but I believe he is wrong), must resolutely be thrown in the bin. Given our longstanding
    investigations in mathematics, which we thought had no relevance to this matter, like the hypercapitalist von Neumann, we use game theory, but unlike him, we consider not
    only capitalist zero-sum, or competitive games, but include Communist positive sum, or cooperative games. Our whole theory of social interactions is based on the total viability
    and coherence of cooperative games.

    In studying the interface of capitalist and Communist systems, we are faced with the existence of a boundary. In fact, our general classification goes beyond that and we consider
    negative sum games. What is a negative sum game? It is a game like those played by the Rothschilds. They are unethical games based on the destruction, in a two-person game,
    of both parties. When we look at one game which is cooperative, its binary opposite is a negative sum game. Its boundary is a competitive game, conceptually. This game forms
    one object. In our mathematics we deal with multiobjects and multitransformations. There is a very important theorem for multiobjects and multitransformations, which is easy
    to state, I believe is as important as the Pythagoras theorem, and has just as many practical applications. It is the bouncing theorem. It states that an ensemble of multiobjects and
    multitransformations is equivalent to a larger set of multiobjects and one transformation. Indeed this transformation has important technical properties which make it easy to deal
    with. It is 'monotonic' and therefore 'invertible'. This means we have a mathematical model which can deal, at least in principle, with many game objects in mutual interaction.
    We would say this is a rather practical and direct description of politics.

    Consciousness as transformations

    Xiqus represent local consciousness

    All xiqus represent global consciousness

    Oneness underlies global consciousness

    This is not the only idea